Pastoralist-farmer conflict in Kaduna and Kogi States, the situation of pastoralists in Katsina and Sokoto States, 2017

FINAL CIRCULATION VERSION

Project No. 131-004-1030 ZG, 131-010-1021 XG, 131-015-1030 ZG, 131-026-1019 ZG

EVALUATION N° 2166-Z1031-1158

Roger Blench
8, Guest Road
Cambridge CB1 2AL
United Kingdom
Voice/Ans (00-44)-(0)1223-560687
Mobile worldwide (00-44)-(0)7847-495590
E-mail rogerblench@yahoo.co.uk
http://www.rogerblench.info/RBOP.htm

This version, Cambridge, 12 September 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ i
1. Introduction: background to the mission ............................................................................................. 1
2. The Central Nigerian States .................................................................................................................. 2
   2.1 Kaduna ............................................................................................................................................ 2
   2.1.1 State background ....................................................................................................................... 2
   2.1.2 Conflict ..................................................................................................................................... 3
   2.1.3 Efforts at peace and reconciliation .......................................................................................... 3
   2.2 Kogi ................................................................................................................................................. 3
   2.2.1 State background ....................................................................................................................... 3
   2.2.2 Conflicts ..................................................................................................................................... 5
   2.3 Plateau .......................................................................................................................................... 6
   2.3.1 State background ....................................................................................................................... 6
   2.3.2 Conflicts ..................................................................................................................................... 7
3. Northern States and the sources of migrant pastoralism ..................................................................... 8
   3.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 8
   3.2 Katsina State ................................................................................................................................. 8
   3.2.1 State background ....................................................................................................................... 8
   3.2.2 Pastoral systems ....................................................................................................................... 9
   3.3.3 The strange tale of the family cattle-rustlers ......................................................................... 12
   3.3 Sokoto State ................................................................................................................................. 12
   3.3.1 State background ..................................................................................................................... 12
   3.3.2 Pastoralism ............................................................................................................................. 14
4. Grazing Reserves and stockroutes ..................................................................................................... 15
5. Security issues ..................................................................................................................................... 15
   5.1 Cattle-rustling and banditry .......................................................................................................... 15
   5.2 Drug use ...................................................................................................................................... 16
   5.3 Security service response ............................................................................................................. 16
6. Awareness creation ............................................................................................................................. 16
   6.1 How should we disseminate information? .................................................................................... 16
   6.2 The potential of radio .................................................................................................................. 16
   6.3 The role of the mobile phone ....................................................................................................... 17
   6.4 Internet presence ........................................................................................................................ 17
   6.5 Analytic versus narrative reporting ............................................................................................. 17
7. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 17
Some widespread misconceptions ......................................................................................................... 17
References ............................................................................................................................................... 19
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The two main goals of the mission were to provide more in-depth information on the farmer-pastoralist conflict in Kaduna, Kogi and Plateau States of central Nigeria, and to interview pastoral leaders in Katsina and Sokoto States in relation to southwards migrations of their herds and ensuing conflicts.
- The outcome was to be a workshop in collaboration with DREP, Jos, to bring together experiences from the different dioceses and plan further collaborative action.
- Extensive interviews were conducted with both pastoralists’ and farmers’ leaders in Kogi, Kaduna, Plateau, Katsina and Sokoto states, as well as government officials and relevant NGOs concerned with this issue.
- A workshop was held in Jos, August 25-26th, 2017, to discuss analysis of existing problems and provide training.
- A preliminary version of this report was submitted to MISEREOR on 7th September 2017. It was discussed in Aachen on 4th October and a revised version was submitted on 10th October. This report repeats the background and conclusions of previous reports only in summary form. Most content results from the current mission.

The main findings were as follows;

- The worst situation encountered was in Kaduna State, where a series of violent incidents, some only weeks before the mission, had resulted in high levels of mortality. The cause of this appears to be unchecked banditry, with herders as much victims as farmers.
- Kogi State has experienced a much lower level of incidents from around 2010, principally on the east bank of the Niger. Measures to prevent conflicts have been put in place on the west bank and appear to be largely successful.
- The situation in Plateau State, first reported in May 2016 remains serious, but conflict levels are currently reduced. Attempts to broker peace agreements in Pankshin and Shendam seem to be bringing some success. However, other areas of Plateau State are experiencing inter-communal conflict not connected with the herders.
- Broadly speaking, herder/farmer conflict has been much more effectively managed in the northwestern states of Sokoto and Katsina.
- Katsina State in particular has effective collaboration between pastoral organisations, traditional rulers and local government to protect Grazing Reserves and stock routes from encroachment.
- It became clear that the origin of rogue herds causing damage in the southwest is not Sokoto and Katsina but Zamfara and Kebbi States.
- Security aspects of this situation can only be dealt with by the Nigerian government although lobbying can achieve changes in policy.
- Nonetheless, there are many areas where NGOs and CBOs can act to improve matters by defusing tension. These include;
  - The creation of more effective information sharing systems. The mission found that little was known about events and policy in areas outside the immediate concern of individual projects. However a broader vision is essential in dealing with pastoralists, where remote events frequently affect local interactions.
  - The more effective use of vernacular media to communicate analysis and information to all sides in conflict situations.
  - The development of an internet presence, both to promote the goals of the organisation and to respond effectively to public enquiry as well as improving advocacy.
  - A more systematic assessment of the role of traditional leaders in both reconciliation and exacerbation of conflict and dissemination of lessons learnt.

The current plans are to undertake a further mission in November 2017, along the same lines as the present one.
Visits to communities in the southwest of Nigeria, particularly Osun and Ondo, to follow up on Oyo and Ekiti visits in 2016 and develop a southwest coalition via a workshop to be held at the end of November 2017

Additional goals:

- Develop a more comprehensive network of connections with diocesan offices and the problems they are experiencing.
- Expand training in analytic report writing to a wide range of partner individuals as well as developing schedules of reporting.
- Develop a regional database of trusted interlocutors, especially among pastoralists and train offices in the use of this.
- Following positive experiences in some states, the workshop participants suggested the possibility of a study tour in the north.
- To disseminate more accurate information about the status of pastoralists in Nigeria.
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

1. Introduction: background to the mission

Since 2001, the Jos crisis, Nigeria has seen a continuing expansion of conflict between farmers and the pastoralist FulBe, the traditional cattle-herders who have grazed their herds in the semi-arid regions for centuries. With the changing ecology and security environment following the creation of colonial Nigeria, the herders were able to move south and exploit the rich grazing of the higher rainfall zones. This was made possible by a reduced fear of attacks on herds and veterinary advances, protecting the cattle against the trypanosomoses, which had previously kept them out.

On the whole, this large-scale migration southwards was peaceable, and the government of Nigeria, both under the British and in the post-Independence era, made efforts to facilitate the process by demarcating cattle routes and establishing grazing reserves. Since Nigeria has a very large urban sector which requires both meat and dairy products, this was largely seen as beneficial to the overall economy.

However, this migration took place in an era when the human population was still relatively small and land was freely available. However, Nigeria has undergone rapid demographic change and there is now significant competition for land throughout the Central Zone. The northern, semi-arid and Sahelian zones have always had a higher population and the rapid increase, together with climate change, has now pushed the herders further south. Inevitably, the pastoralist concept of free access to grazing and rivers upon which their lifestyle depends, is in conflict with the farmers, who have more stable concepts of land ownership. Hence the dramatic acceleration in resource conflicts which have become more numerous, widespread and violent.

The narrative of resource conflict is conveniently simple, and has been emerging from both sides. Typically, it is associated with a religious characterisation, Christianity versus Islam. The characteristic response has been a corresponding growth in reconciliation and peace meetings, where available figures on both sides of the divide agree to resolve their differences. These processes have been manifestly unsuccessful, and violent incidents continue unabated. The explanation may lie in the fact that quite different conflicts are being played out within the context of the farmer/pastoralist conflicts. The potential wealth of Nigeria is such that both politicians and gangsters are willing to undertake extremely ruthless strategies against their opponents. These can be very effectively disguised by appealing to conventional stereotypes. There is strong evidence that both bandits and the dispossessed of diverse ethnic groups have been manipulated by politicians to serve narrow local interests. This in turn has played into the hands of both professional insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and regional criminal groups, including those involved in the drugs trade, thereby exacerbating the violence. All sides are served by characterising these conflicts as either over resources or religion or both.

The series of missions, of which this is the fourth, arise from a series of reports of violent incidents reported by diocesan communities across the Central Zone of Nigeria. The Justice, Peace and Development Committees (the exact form of the name varies from state to state and the system is here abbreviated to JDPs) have made this known to MISEREOR and there have been scattered projects for peace and reconciliation. Rather larger-scale initiatives, such as DREP in Jos, have been funded from a variety of archdiocesan sources.

The current report follows those of May and September 2016, arising from feedback in various communities in the dioceses of the Middle Belt and Southwestern states. MISEREOR requested the consultant to investigate the situation in three states, Kaduna, Kogi and Plateau, with a view to developing a more in-depth analysis of the roots of the conflicts, to evaluate existing initiatives and to make proposals for policy options to improve the situation. A mission to Nigeria was undertaken from the 20th of July to 2nd September 2017. The end of the process was a workshop held in Jos, 25-26 August, 2017, where representatives of the dioceses were present. The Terms of Reference are given at

---

1 Roger Blench was accompanied throughout by the consultant, Mal. Umaru Hassan, a Fulfulde-speaker who has worked on pastoral issues for many years. My thanks to all of them.
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version
the end of this document. An itinerary of field visits undertaken is given in Appendix II. Appendix III
presents the schedule of the workshop, together with a summary of the discussions.

In view of the previous reports, much of the general background to the conflict is only repeated here in
summary form. The format is much the same as the previous reports, but has been updated throughout.

2. The Central Nigerian States

2.1 Kaduna

2.1.1 State background

Kaduna State was created in 1967, but its boundaries derive from much older administrative creations,
since Kaduna was the capital of Northern Nigeria from 1916 onwards. It was for a long time a
manufacturing centre, but the rise of Abuja has caused it to go into economic decline. The rainfall is
typical of the subhumid zone, with up to 1000 mm annually, and much of the land area is open savannah
and grasslands marked by scattered inselbergs. The state is dominated by a major ethnic divide as the
north is essentially Hausa/Fulani and predominantly Muslim, whereas the south is highly multi-ethnic
with more than sixty distinct groups. Historically, the region south of Zaria was dominated by the Jema’a
Emirate, which was effectively a slave-raiding base. This dominance was perpetuated by the British
colonial system, which placed Hausa-affiliated District Heads in charge of the south of the state. As
education spread via the missions, and most of these groups became Christian, there has been increasing
resentment of this imbalance. Table 1 shows the basic demographic data estimated for Kaduna State;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,066,562 (2005 est.)</td>
<td>46,053 km²</td>
<td>130/km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 1 shows an outline of Kaduna State with the main interview sites added.

Map 1. Kaduna State
Kaduna State consists of two dioceses, Kaduna itself and Kafancan, some 150 km southeast of Kaduna. Both have JDPs, with the Kaduna branch now known as the PDI (Peace and Development Initiative).

### 2.1.2 Conflict

Kaduna State has seen some of the most vicious inter-communal conflict in the region in recent years. A few weeks prior to the mission, 17th July 2017, a massacre took place in Kajuru, southeast of Kaduna. It seems to have begun with a relatively trivial dispute and rapidly accelerated to communal killing, focusing on women and children. The settlement of Misisi was attacked by a large-scale armed group earlier in 2017 and many houses burnt. In this area, the indigenous population, the Adara, have lived in generally peaceful co-operation with the FulBe herders, who are settled in encampments throughout the area. Both sides, the Adara farmers and the FulBe, seem to have had many killed. Refugees from burnt villages are currently living with relatives and dependent on charity for food. A still worse event took place in Godogodo in May 2016, when more than two hundred people were killed. However, communal clashes have a long history in Southern Kaduna, going back to the Zangon Kataf crisis of 1992, which pitted local people against resident Hausa. In the 2000s, there were also several clashes between ethnic groups where pastoralists were not involved.

The interpretation of these recent events is quite problematic, but it seems that the incidents in Godogodo and other areas were not conflicts between herders and farmers, but rather freelance bandits were responsible. These bandit gangs seem to include both FulBe who have lost their cattle and members of other ethnic groups. Apart from cattle rustling, they engage in kidnapping for ransom. The result is a climate of fear which is not allayed by the inaction of the authorities.

### 2.1.3 Efforts at peace and reconciliation

Kaduna State, because of the high levels of violence, has had more than its fair share of attempts to reduce conflict. Apart from the activities of the JDPs, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, NRSP, Mercycorps, USAID and Search for Common Ground have all conducted reconciliation exercises. The poster in Photo 1 shows the sort of self-exculpating declarations which these organizations encourage. It is fair to say that given the current situation these have been worse than useless. This is in part because the source of the violence is not underlyingly communal conflict but simply criminality. Approaches that assume dialogue between imagined players will resolve the issue of banditry are simply unrealistic. This is a security issue and must be dealt with in that fashion.

### 2.2 Kogi

#### 2.2.1 State background

Kogi State was created in 1991 at the confluence of the Benue and Niger rivers, and includes the Koton Karfe bridge at Lokoja. The presence of two important bridges, at Lokoja and Ajaokuta, makes Kogi an important trade and transport axis connecting northern and southern Nigeria. The Niger-Benue confluence was also previously an important missionary centre for journeys further into Northern Nigeria (Photo 2). The east bank of the Niger is dominated by the Igala people, whose centre is at Idah, but there are also Bassa and Bassa-Nge. The west bank is dominated by the Ebira, whose centre is at Okene, and various small polities of the Okun section of the Yoruba. The east bank is fairly flat and wooded, whereas a line of low hills dominates the west bank. Population remains quite low in many areas, although
important commercial centres such as the state capital at Lokoja are growing rapidly. Politically, the state has been in turmoil since 2015, following a disputed election for the post of governor. Salaries have not been paid, which is undermining the normal work of State and Local Government. Table 2 shows the basic demographic data for Kogi State estimated for 2005;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Demographic data, Kogi State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,595,796 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29,833 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Photo 2. Niger-Benue confluence

Map 2 shows the outline of Kogi State with the main interview sites added.
2.2.2 Conflicts

Kogi State has a very different profile east and west of the Niger. The eastern area, dominated by the Igala people, has experienced some spillover from the conflicts in Benue State, especially in the Local Governments which border it. Refugees from the Agatu crisis in 2016 have been arriving in the northeast of Kogi State. A similar effect has been problems in southern Kogi following conflicts in the neighbouring densely populated Igbo areas. Conflicts further south in Enugu and Nsukka, have resulted in Fulani fleeing these states and competing for grazing in Kogi State, putting greater pressure on the Igala areas. Kogi State has a number of Forest Reserves which are acting as de facto Grazing Reserves; government should take steps to regularise their legal status.

Photo 3. Idah Poster condemning kidnapping

Source: Author photo
Conflicts in this region remain small-scale, and the traditional rulers have largely been playing an active part in bringing together pastoral and farming communities to resolve issues. The Atagala of Idah (Photo 4) has personally taken an interest in resolving these issues and heads up a state committee to bring together community leaders. Nonetheless, Kogi is threatened by the instability in neighbouring states south and east, and pre-emptive action to reduce these impacts remains a priority.

West of the Niger, in the region largely inhabited by Edira and Yoruba-related peoples, the situation is still fairly much in equilibrium and there have been no violent incidents or deaths. The main FulBe populations on the west bank originate from further west, and are the same Bargu’en as are resident in Ekiti, Kwara and Oyo states. They speak Yoruba and herd cattle for the local wealthy elites, so relations are generally good. However, around thirty years ago, in 1990, herders arrived from Katsina and the adjacent semi-arid areas, first on a seasonal basis and then settling permanently. They first occupied the hilly areas, which were then sparsely populated, and their herding practice is to send the cattle down to the plains during the day and return at night. Importantly, local rulers have taken pre-emptive action in creating regular fora to discuss potential conflict issues. Photo 5 shows the Kabiyesi of the Okun community at Mopa, who has led these fora in his area. Very little conflict has been reported, illustrating the importance of building community relations in this fashion. There is a Forest Reserve in the southwest of this region, and this is often used for grazing by the local Fulani.

### 2.3 Plateau

#### 2.3.1 State background

Plateau State is focused on its capital Jos, originally established as a centre for tin-mining. The Jos Plateau, at around 1200m, is comparatively cool compared with the lowlands and is attractive for settlement for both humans and livestock due to the reduced disease burden. The State is very multi-ethnic, with more than sixty languages spoken within its boundaries. Unlike the surrounding states, Plateau State is predominantly Christian and is an important missionary centre. Plateau is divided into three dioceses, with an archdiocese in Jos. The other two dioceses are Shendam, created 2007, and Pankshin in 2011. Table 3 shows the basic demographic data for Plateau State, estimated for 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area km²</th>
<th>Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,178,712 (2006)</td>
<td>30,913</td>
<td>103/km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 3 shows the outline of Plateau State with the main interview sites added.
Since 2001, when a major conflict broke out in Jos and spread to rural areas, Plateau State has been plagued by recurrent incidents, especially in the region around Jos, where open warfare between the resident Berom and the FulBe led to high levels of mortality, exacerbated by the supply of heavy weapons to both sides. This has been described in more detail in a MISEREOR report for May 2016. Since that period, the situation has improved somewhat, partly because the availability of weapons has decreased. FulBe herds can now be seen in the Jos area again. Nonetheless, the underlying conflicts are far from resolved.

Another major zone of conflict is the Bokkos area, southeast of Jos. This was previously a region of good practice and a survey in 2002 reported good co-operation between FulBe and farmers. Regrettably, this broke down around 2014, and there was heavy mortality of both farmers and FulBe. Order has been partly restored, but the villages remain unsafe for survey work. The Wase region has also been an area of intermittent clashes, although this is partly inter-ethnic, between the Hausa and the Jukun people.

Fortunately, the situation in other regions of Plateau State is significantly less tense. Interviews in Panyam in 2016 showed that although there were minor conflicts over crop damage, no serious violence had occurred. The situation in Pankshin is similar, despite issues over under-age herding, livestock access to human water points and crop damage. However, there have been no violent conflicts. Pankshin diocese is experimenting with the idea of a ‘Code of Conduct’ to be signed by both herders and farmers. This would commit both parties to keep to established routes and not to use under-age herders, as well as to submitting to arbitration on the subject of crop damage. Whether this will work remains to be seen, but in principle it is a useful model.
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

The situation in Shendam is somewhat uneven. Around Shendam town itself, the situation is generally peaceful, due to good co-operation between the local ardos, the traditional ruler, the Long Goemai, and the Local Government. The resident FulBe have been in the area for about eighty years and have generally built up good relations with local people. In addition, they send their herds away from the area for most of the year. In the wet season, the herds are split, with milking cows staying at the residence, and the rest of the herd going with part of the family to the Langtang area, northeast of Shendam. They return just after harvest to make use of the crop residues and once these are finished, they leave again. In the dry season, the herds are sent to the banks of the River Benue. The main problem in terms of conflict arises with seasonal nomads. In the east of Plateau, transhumant herds pass down from Bauchi and Jigawa State, making their way to Benue grazing. When they return, in the early rains, they sometimes enter newly planted fields.

3. Northern States and the sources of migrant pastoralism

3.1 Overview

The focus of the mission has been on states in the central zone where the majority of the problems are reported. However, interviews in the southwest in November 2016 showed that most of the violent conflicts had occurred with ‘rogue herds’ coming from further north, managed by young men without families. These herders had not built links with resident FulBe leaders and are constantly on the move, making negotiations difficult. As a consequence, Ekiti State has passed highly discriminatory anti-pastoral legislation. In the light of this, additional visits were made to Katsina and Sokoto States, to establish the truth of these reports and to suggest practical solutions through establishing dialogue with pastoral leaders.

3.2 Katsina State

3.2.1 State background

Katsina State was created in 1987 from the former Kaduna State. The mean temperature is 26.0 °C and the annual rainfall is ca. 600 mm, placing it squarely in the semi-arid zone, with the core staple crop pearl millet. The main population is Hausa farmers, and it is thus almost entirely Muslim. Urban minorities professing Christianity are present in the larger towns. The state corresponds approximately to the former Katsina Emirate and the Emir of Katsina, the traditional ruler, remains an important and politically influential figure. By comparison with Central Zone states, Katsina State is well managed. Roads, public sanitation are more organised and government is more responsive to the needs of rural communities. The northern border with the Republic of Niger constitutes a major trade axis, especially for livestock. There is also a substantial seasonal migration across the border by transhumant herders, especially FulBe. The basic demographic data for Katsina State is shown in Table 4;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area km²</th>
<th>Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,483,429 (2005)</td>
<td>24,192</td>
<td>268/km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 4 shows the outline of Katsina State with the main interview sites added.
Katsina State encompasses one of the largest Grazing Reserves in Nigeria, the Runka reserve. This was created as a Forest Reserve in 1922 and has been adapted into a Grazing Reserve (Map 5). It has been the subject of a number of studies and until the early 2000s, was maintained in relatively good shape, ecologically speaking (Hof 2006). It is adjacent to the Zamfara Grazing Reserve, which has been the subject of extensive study and development (Hoffmann 1998; Hof 2000). However, the entry into the reserve on the Katsina side by bandits from Zamfara have created a zone of instability and no control of grazing has been possible.

3.3.2 Pastoral systems

3.3.2.1 Overview

Herding systems in Katsina State are

Source: Hof (2006)
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

best described as agropastoral, as there are now very few cattle-herding households which do not also grow staple foods. RIM (1992a) constitutes the most recent overview of livestock system in Katsina State. Some of the migrant pastoralists who enter from Niger on a seasonal basis are non-cultivators, especially the camel and sheep herders. Ox-ploughing is the major method of tilling soil and most households either own or hire ploughs and oxen. The very high population density has the consequence that cattle are sent to areas where they cannot accidentally enter fields during the growing season. Almost all herders now supplement their herds during the dry season, buying groundnut cake and other items in the market.

The system of cattle-tracks, burti, and Grazing Reserves has made a major contribution towards reducing conflict between herders and farmers. However, in recent years, it has begun to break down, with farmers encroaching both the tracks and the protected areas. More problematic still has been the rise of banditry, especially cattle-rustling, with the bandits actually based in the Runka Reserve, which is related the even more problematic freedom to operate which bandit gangs have in Zamfara State. However, some of the bandits were related to local households in the nearby settlements (§3.3.3).

The State government has taken a particular interest in the issues of overgrazing, cattle rustling and farmer-herder conflict. Since 2015, Katsina State has begun to take positive action to reduce conflict. They have cleared the reserve of farming encroachment, cleared out the bandit gangs and begun the process of re-establishing the cattle routes. This has already had highly positive impacts in the community. Another important innovation is the introduction of grazing permits (Photo 6). These are being issued by the Standing Committee on Co-operation between Farmers and Herdsmen, established together with Miyetti Allah (Photo 7). This is a good start, although in the longer term it will have to be recognised by neighbouring states.

Katsina borders Niger Republic and many pastoral populations have traditionally moved between the two countries. Katsina State is part of a migratory route for Uda’en herders from Niger, who pass through at the beginning of the dry season and return in the early wet. They herd five species, the sheep, cow, goat, donkey and camel. The Uda’en depend largely on browse so local pastoralists do not see them as competition. As they are not usually in Nigeria in the farming season, there are rarely problems with this group. Niger is a much more tightly controlled country, where matters such as illegal movement and grazing are treated seriously. Even so, efforts are being made to increase cross-border co-operation. ROPEN, which is the Niger association for herders, has been organising a series of meetings in Zinder, also attended by Katsina State officials, to try and regularise movement from the Francophone side. Ironically, it is much easier to reach agreement with Francophone countries than with states further south in Nigeria, such as Zamfara, where a laissez-faire attitude obtains. As one official commented, ‘it is easier to get co-operation with our Niger neighbours than with other states in Nigeria’.

Interviews in Katsina State strongly suggested that the problematic herders encountered in the southwest do not originate here, despite claims to the contrary. Nearly all those whose migration patterns were plotted only move short distances, partly because crop farming is now a major element in household

Photo 6. Katsina State Grazing Permit

Katsina State Grazing Permit

Photo 7. Standing Committee, Katsina State

Source: Author photo
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

subsistence and the use of residues is now a crucial aspect of the feed cycle. Impressionistically, Katsina State, and the adjacent Sokoto State are visibly areas where herding is conducted responsibly. The cattle have a sufficient numbers of herdmens to control them and they are sufficiently mature to have the appropriate skills and experience, in sharp contrast with the situation further south.

3.3.2.2 Upside-down pastoralism

The most striking aspect of pastoralism in Katsina State is that the normal pattern of migration can be inverted, when the herds are sent northwards away from the community. This is markedly different from the situation elsewhere in Nigeria, where herds typically migrate south. Herds in this area are usually split, with young animals and milking animals kept at the homestead and the remainder sent away with the younger men. To understand this, case studies were undertaken in several LGAs. These are given below;

Keita LGA

The local FulBe are agropastoralists, and their own crop residues play a significant role in their production system. They send the animals away with the young men, northwards to Niger, approximately half-way through the growing season. This allows them to graze on rich pastures which develop after the rains set in. The herds come back south after the guinea-corn harvest, i.e. around December, when they can graze the residues. This pattern is long-established and the transhumants have established relations with local herders in Niger.

Relations between Hausa farmers and resident FulBe are generally good, but there was a major conflict around 2010. Herds from Zamfara State on a circuit which included continuing to Jigawa State would arrive in the early harvest season to try and access crop residues without permission from farmers. This was the cause of significant fighting in villages, as the Zamfara herders were armed. After years of being harassed by incoming Zamfara and Jigawa herders, the Hausa took up arms. However, 419 confidence tricksters toured the villages selling a charm which purported to ward off bullets. Needless to say, it didn’t work and seven farmers were killed. However, subsequent action by government to reduce Zamfara invasions has now reduced the problem. There was a major shootout with police in 2014 and since then there has been no trouble.

Since around 1980, Uda sheep herders have been entering the region in the dry season. Uda sheep are specialised in browse, and *gawo* (*Faidherbia albida*), a nitrogen-fixing acacia tree, is part of the soil fertility system. The herders were cutting the branches of this tree to feed to their herds as browse, leading to conflict. A cross-border meeting has been held to try and restrain this practice, and current rules prevent the cutting of *gawo*.

Safana LGA

Safana LGA borders the Runka Grazing Reserve, which at 123 km², is one of the largest in Nigeria. Runka has played an important role in preserving some forest in Katsina State, which is otherwise one of the more heavily populated states. Until recently, encroachment in the reserve by farmers had begun to make inroads on available grazing, but as of late 2016, the State Government had agreed to clear agricultural villages, and by mid-2017, the great majority of farmers had been moved out. At the same time, a commitment was made to clear farms from the cattle-routes as well, though this has yet to be fully implemented.

The great majority of herder households in the Safana area are agropastoral, i.e. they practice some agriculture, mostly millet and cowpea cultivation. Their system was to migrate between the reserve and the outside areas, where they farm and keep more permanent houses. The herds are moved into the reserve in the growing season, in order to reduce the risk of crop damage. When the crop residues are available after harvest, they move out of the reserve to take advantage of this feed resource.
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

Ingawa LGA

The FulBe pastoralists here are all from the Sulebanko’en clan. They formerly took their herds to Runka Grazing Reserve every wet season, but stopped about three years ago in 2014 as a consequence of the problems with cattle rustling. The animals now stay around the compound until the FulBe and then the farmers harvest, eat the residues and move southwards with the herds for a few months towards Kaduna State. They stay there until the rains begin and move back home, so they are only away for about three months. However, now the cattle produce very poorly because of the poor water and grazing. A feature of this area is the widespread use of live fencing to control livestock including *Euphorbia kamerunica* (*kerana*), the same species of spiny ‘cactus’ as on the Jos Plateau (Photo 8). The construction of mixed species hedges is also common.

### 3.3.3 The strange tale of the family cattle-rustlers

Katsina State has been plagued with cattle-rusting, but as with most things in Nigeria, it is not a simple story. Around 2011, there was a major expansion of cattle theft, with mixed bands of FulBe youth and other unemployed people hiding in the bush and stealing animals. However, as the elders said, ‘we know who their families are’. It seems this was treated as an annoyance but was tolerated, because the family system would not allow reporting them to the authorities. However, by 2014 the incidence of cattle rustling had apparently become intolerable, and finally in 2016 it was decided to take action. Negotiations were held with the rustlers (who had apparently also stockpiled weapons) and they were theatrically pardoned and welcomed back into their extended families.

### 3.3 Sokoto State

#### 3.3.1 State background

Sokoto State was created in 1976, but broadly corresponds to the old Sultanate of Sokoto, founded by Usman dan Fodio in 1804, and the origin of the jihad which brought much of what is now northern Nigeria under Muslim rule. The Sultan of Sokoto, the traditional ruler, remains an important figure, and is regarded as the leader of Nigeria’s Muslim community. Sokoto State is largely in the Sahel, and dry season temperatures can reach 45°C. Mean annual rainfall is about 600 mm, slightly more in the south of the state, Crops grow mostly on the floodplains of the Sokoto-Rima river system, which
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

is covered with rich alluvial soil. Millet is the main staple, complemented by rice, maize, other cereals and beans. Onions constitute a major cash crop and are stored to release on the market at times of maximum prices (Photo 9).

The population of Sokoto State is almost entirely Hausa and Muslim, with small Christian minorities in major towns. FulBe presence is both nomadic and settled agropastoral. Apart from the FulBe, there are seasonal migrants from Niger. Uda sheep herders arrive for the dry season, as in Katsina State, but there are also Tuareg and Arabs from Niger, principally camel herders who sell animals in the market at Illela near the Niger border. Camels and donkeys play a crucial role in the productive system of Sokoto, as camels are used for ploughing, and donkeys for transporting loads and farm produce.

### Table 5. Demographic data, Sokoto State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area  km²</th>
<th>Density 163/km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,244,399 (2005)</td>
<td>25,973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 6 shows the outline of Sokoto State with the main interview sites added.

### Map 6. Sokoto State

Institutionally, the state is relatively well-regulated with effective road maintenance, although utilities such as electricity remain very poor. Compared with Katsina State, attention to pastoralist issues is weak. Regrettably, Miyetti Allah, the main pastoral organisation, has only a very weak presence in Sokoto State. Its offices turned out to be devoid of furniture and fittings. Pastoralists interviewed noted that they had no interactions with its officers. However, somewhat surprisingly, Nomadic Education, which is in disarray in many states, is fully supported by the State Government and has developed a full school curriculum in Fulfulde.
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

3.3.2 Pastoralism

The pastoral system in the Sokoto area dates back to the period of the Jihad around two centuries ago, when many of the villages were founded, and it became a centre of Islamic learning. As in Katsina, almost all the resident FulBe are agropastoral, and use camel-ploughs to cultivate extensive millet fields. Relations between Hausa farmers and the FulBe are remarkably good in most villages with only minor disputes recorded. This can in part be attributed to proactive local government, which takes action to resolve issues, and keep stock routes clear of encroachment.

Fandirma (Wamakko LGA)

The FulBe in Fandirma are agropastoralists, growing extensive millet fields for subsistence, although not using the plough and not growing cash crops. They are the only pastoralists using this area and relations with crop farmers are generally good. The cattle stay in the area for most of the year but the young men move south to LGAs in southern Sokoto and adjacent Zamfara. They have been doing this for more than half a century. The cattle leave at the beginning of the rains and return for the crop residues, which they buy from the farmers. The most surprising aspect of socio-economic change is the revaluing of milk. Demand for local milk in Sokoto is high and some women go to town to sell directly, others act as agents for local wives and aggregate to sell to dealers. Dealers also come from town and buy directly. This is a welcome change, since the importation of milk powder and tinned milk in Nigeria for decades has gradually reduced the value of the dairy trade, which has resulted in the economic disempowerment of women.

Cakari village, Damboa Local Government

Cakari village is in a remote area and seems to have been bypassed by Nigeria’s usual troubles. The residents are uniformly FulBe and agropastoralists. The herds are sent southwards to Niger State, especially the Kontagora region, during the wet season. This has now been the practice for three decades, since about 1990. Before that, the animals were kept around the village all year. No conflict or problems with cattle-rustling were reported in this area.

Jegarare village, Shagari Local Government

All FulBe are agropastoralists, using camels to pull ploughs. They are all from a single clan, the Toranko’en. They send their cattle away for most of the year; at the beginning of the dry season they go with the young men towards Kwara State, some even as far as Ọyọ, reaching Ogbomosho. They admit there has been some ‘trouble’ and that some of the young men have been arrested and have had to be released from jail through intervention from Miyetti Allah. They then leave and return to western Niger State, returning in the village only for the period of crop residues. This circuit has been in place for about a decade. Women milk dealers come from town and buy milk in bulk and take it to urban markets. This is a good reflection of the impact of reduced feed resources.

Tarke village, Illela Local Government

Tarke village is extremely close to a large open wetland or fadama, and is thus a productive site for dry-season cultivation, for both Hausa farmers and FulBe. The FulBe are all agropastoralists, using camel-drawn ploughs to cultivate large millet fields. The abundance of water makes it possible for the herds to stay close to the village throughout the dry season, but they are taken away by the young men during the farming season to avoid crop damage. Unusually, there are split destinations, with one group going some 60 km. south to a hurmi, while others travel northwards to grazing in Niger. They have access to a grazing reserve, and local stockroutes are still protected, although these have narrowed in recent years. No conflict with farmers was reported.
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version
Maimaso village, Gwadabawa Local Government

Similar to Tarke, the inhabitants of Maimaso are FulBe agropastoralists. The cattle remain around the village in the dry season and leave during the wet, returning in December for the crop residues. Also, as in other areas, the herds go north into Niger. They attempted to go south and east towards Goronyo in recent years but were driven away by the prevalence of cattle rustling. The people of Maimaso have no problems with the farmers. They still find a market for milk and dairy products in nearby towns. However, their wives no longer go to market to sell milk, but rather elder women act of wholesalers and come to the village and buy in bulk.

4. Grazing Reserves and stockroutes

The colonial and early Independence era saw the establishment of system of grazing reserves and stock routes, intended to create spaces for pastoralists and thereby minimise conflict. These systems have been maintained for a long time, and broadly speaking have been respected. Unfortunately, however, legal responsibility for maintaining the stock routes was given to the states. In many cases the states have rejected even the concept, claiming they have no mandate to support what are essentially Federal regulations. A functioning system of stockroutes is an essential tool in reducing conflict between herders and farmers and with the rise in human population has become more important, not less. If such a network was fully functional it would be a valuable tool in reducing conflict, but unfortunately, these routes exist only in theory in many places. Since the states are controlled by politicians elected by farmers, they have little interest in maintaining the system and in some cases have openly declared they do not accept it. The campaign against Grazing Reserves is now increasingly public in some states (Photo 10). The policy alternative outlined by government is the promotion of ranches, despite the long history of failure of these2.

The more southern states where many large herds are now migrating, particularly south of the Niger-Benue system, were not considered pastoral when the stockroutes were established, so there is no effective legislation. This is important when state governments make the argument that the herders are recent illegal migrants. However, in practice, some of these routes have operated for up to a century (as in Benue and Taraba) and deserve rather to be made legal. Similarly, there are no Grazing Reserves, but Forest Reserves do exist (and all the northern Grazing Reserves were simply Forest Reserves from the colonial era whose purpose was altered). An effective policy response would thus be to reconsider existing policy on reserves.

5. Security issues

5.1 Cattle-rustling and banditry

A more general breakdown of law and order has followed the insurgency in the Northeast and this has been manifested by the rise in banditry, cattle-rustling and kidnapping. Especially since 2010, there has been a major expansion of cattle rustling and associated kidnapping, reflecting a combination of youth unemployment, pastoralists who have lost their herds and a lax security environment. Given the lack of herding skills among farmers, it is credible that the rustlers consist of gangs which include FulBe who have lost their cattle in association with thieves, and connect to networks which can transport the stolen livestock the large markets in the south, where they rapidly disappear. Government response has so far been ineffectual, as the rustlers live in remote areas and are hard to catch by conventional means. Nonetheless, the stolen cattle must be fed into the marketing system and transported past checkpoints. If such cattle can move freely, this does not provide confidence that action is being taken. The unchecked growth of this practice, the suspicion that the powerful people behind it are being protected, all adds to a climate of distrust.

---

2 See the Working Paper on ranches, submitted separately
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

An important finding of the current mission was the significance of Zamfara State in sheltering bandit gangs. It seems these can operate with impunity there, which makes it difficult for states which have a greater preference for order to counter their influence. All the evidence from Kaduna State suggested the banditry currently plaguing their communities originates in Zamfara. Most importantly, holding peace and reconciliation meetings is of little value, if inter-communal conflict is not the underlying problem.

5.2 Drug use

In interviews in all the states visited, the use of drugs, both legal and illegal, was often mentioned as a factor in exacerbating conflict. Hard drugs, heroin and cocaine, are rare except in big cities, but marijuana is common, cheap and is locally grown. Similarly, legal prescription drugs such as Tramadol are in common use. Nigeria has no prescription system and once a drugseller has a licence, he or she may sell almost any commercial pharmaceutical to customers quite legally. Both pastoralists and traditional leaders consider this is an important factor in further exacerbating aggrieved youth. Drug use clearly plays a role in tipping potential conflict situations into actual violence. Although occasional rather weary posters are seen warning against drug use, there is no evidence these have any effect.

5.3 Security service response

One outcome of this mission was to clarify the differing response of security services to incidents and violent attacks. It is apparent that state governments play an important role in ensuring action is taken, even the forces, such as the police and army, are in theory Federal. Katsina state was able to mobilise the security services to clear out bandits from the Runka reserve. By contrast, the response to bandit gangs in southern Kaduna State was to set up the now-inevitable road checkpoints. As community leaders observed in interviews, these are useless since the bandits operate in remote bush areas, and checkpoints simply restrain lawful trade on the roads. Without proactive strategies to hunt down bandits away from roads, the situation is likely to continue unchecked.

6. Awareness creation

6.1 How should we disseminate information?

Both farmers and pastoralists entertain wrong information about one another and tend to propose highly impractical solutions to current problems. Most typical are plaintive comments that we should return to the former period of collaboration, co-operation and peace. Such days will never return and only realism is a practical response for fixing the problems. In addition, rumours and false accusations have a tendency to circulate rapidly, exacerbating distrust between the two communities. There seems little doubt that insurgents and bandits play on this by using what must be quite exaggerated versions of FulBe dress to give the impression the herders are the attackers. A situation of this type was reported in the Shendam area in 2016, where a gang of supposed herders engaged in robbery on the roads, turned out to be Igbo who had adopted Fulani dress to confuse victims. Government plays no role in correcting this unchecked propaganda. It is therefore of considerable importance to use whatever media is most effective in countering some of the more exaggerated claims. Appendix I, ‘Some widespread misconceptions’, deals with widespread but untrue beliefs about pastoralists in Nigeria.

Nigeria is a quite connected society, where the internet and smartphones play a role in social interaction among urban populations. However, this technology is almost useless in rural areas, where the problems recur. Radio is the only way to reach such populations, and that broadcasts must be in the vernacular, and in a style that convinces hearers of the sympathy of the speaker. Peacebuilding organisations have so far made little use of this cheap and effective method of countering false assertions.

6.2 The potential of radio

One solution that has been so far little explored is the use of vernacular radio. Nigeria has a lively broadcasting scene, and recent trends have been to include more and more languages, both on Federal and private stations. In Ekiti State, the JDP has already begun broadcasting in Yoruba, although so far on non-controversial topics. Reaching rural populations is most effectively achieved through radio and television and the internet are still rare in many areas. The proposal to make radio programmes in different state languages is widely acceptable.
6.3 The role of the mobile phone

Mobile phones began to be widespread in Nigeria from 2005 onwards, and they remain relatively cheap and practical, with good national coverage. Smartphones are common in urban areas, and Nigerians are enthusiastic adherents of social media. However, in rural areas, perhaps surprisingly, a lack of literacy among both herders and farmers has meant that the importance of mobile phones is restricted to voice calls. Even so, access to a phone now plays an important role in herders’ lives. The primary use of the phone is for information concerning grazing and water, something individuals previously would travel long distances to find out. Market prices are an important secondary use, since FulBe economy depends on the sale of small stock for meat. The potential of the smartphone for circulating security information as well as correcting exaggerated claims in the media, as well as linking together pastoral leaders in widely dispersed places has yet to be realised.

6.4 Internet presence

Despite the importance of the internet in spreading ideas in Nigeria, the JDP system has no internet presence. This is indicative of the passive approach taken to the goals of the organisation. It is recommended that each JDP has a website and training sufficient to update it with current activities. Ideally, each body would also have a Facebook page and would be able to promote actions and policies as well as responding to the queries of the public and outside organisations. At present the paradox is that organisations with a mission for advocacy and social change have precisely no tools to achieve these goals.

6.5 Analytic versus narrative reporting

Long-term solutions require effective analysis and this is often sorely lacking in Nigeria. There is a general assumption that conflict resolution and peace-building are desirable and they have accumulated considerable resources. But the continuing violence argues that they are only temporary solutions. Reporting in Nigeria is usually narrative; suitable for agriculture but of limited value in a humanitarian situation. Unless reports dig down to the drivers of conflict, proposed solutions are of no proven value. It is better to try and prevent future conflict than simply to keep on trying to patch up the situation after the event.

7. Conclusions

The mission in July/August 2017 was able to establish the situation in more states in the central zone. It suggests that many of the most serious ‘conflicts’ are not communal in the usual sense of the word, but rather the effects of criminal attacks by bandits which are being framed as attacks by herders. This is turn leads to the conclusion that no amount of the peace and reconciliation processes favoured by external NGOs will have any effect, because this is not the problem. This is a security issue. The workshop, reported separately, spent some trying to address these issues.

The second important finding was that the problematic herds which are the cause of clashes and farm invasions in the southwest are not from Katsina and Sokoto States, but from the region further south, in Kebbi, Zamfara and probably Niger, although we have no direct evidence of this. In fact, Katsina and Sokoot show evidence of a more coherent approach to management of pastoral migration.

Some widespread misconceptions

A. ‘Fulani herdsmen are specially favoured by government’

A view frequently expressed in interviews and confirmed by the intention of the mission to meet with the leaders of the herdsmen is that somehow government takes a particular interest in the welfare of the Fulani and neglects the interests of the farmers. This is a wild misconception and some of the following points should be considered;
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

Since around 2000, all veterinary services to pastoralists have effectively broken down, leaving the herders to find their own treatments.

Despite ‘nomadic education’ being made available in some states from the 1980s onwards, in most areas this has remained drastically underfunded and many of the remoter schools have been allowed to fall into ruin.

Federal government has allowed three states so far to pass strong anti-grazing legislation which effectively discriminates against the Fulani.

Federal and State governments have allowed the system of stockroutes and Grazing Reserves to collapse in many areas thereby creating an arena for conflict due to straying animals.

Livestock markets are some of the least maintained in Nigeria, with no proper facilities for health and sanitation or loading animals.

Fulani herders are the most common victims of kidnapping, due to their ability to raise cash rapidly, and inaction by the security services has exacerbated this situation.

None of this suggests that pastoralists are somehow favoured, indeed the reverse.

B. ‘They are not Nigerians anyway’

Another common view is that since the Fulani are ‘not Nigerians’, they should ‘go back where they came from’, formulations which have unnerving echoes of modern European anti-migrant rhetoric. This is supported by ‘evidence’ that when cattle rustlers were arrested or killed they were supposedly found with Malian or Chadian ID papers. Apart from the unlikelihood that criminals would conveniently carry IDs, it is not the case that the Fulani with whom farmers interact are ‘not Nigerians’, for a simple ecological reason. Cattle in the Sahel are adapted to its semi-arid environment, and are thus red in colour to enable them to more rapidly cool down. Such red cattle are only kept along the extreme northern border of Nigeria (Photo 11), and cross-border migrations do not penetrate the country very far as the cattle tend to die in the higher humidity environments. Hence it is extremely unlikely that any of the herders whose migrations are the subject of numerous complaints are other than Nigerian residents, since all herd white cattle breeds.

**Photo 11. Red cattle of northern Katsina State**

Source: Author photo
Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version

References


Pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Nigerian Central Zone Roger Blench Final version


